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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of JAMES WASHINGTON, 
Petitioner , 
-against- 
ANDREA D. EVANS, Commissioner, 
New York State Division of Parole, 
Respondent, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Appearances: 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 01-1 1-ST2940 Index No. 5012-1 1 
James Washington 
Inmate No. 95-A-7306 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Livingston Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 91 
36 Sonyea Road 
Sonyea, NY 14556 
Eric T. Schneiderman 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
'i he capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Cathy Y. Sheehan, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate at Livingston Correctional F(icility, h w  comrncncc~l thc- 
instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated January 
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25, 201 1 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is currently serving 
concurrent terms of imprisonment consisting of an indeterminate sentence of twenty years 
to life for murder in the second degree, and an indeterminate sentence of five to fifteen years 
for criminal possession of a weapon second degree. 
Among the arguments set forth in the petition, petitioner contends that during his 
incarceration he has completed all programs mandated by the Department of Corrections and 
Community Services (“DOCCS”). He indicates that he has a supportive family, and has 
letters requesting that he be released. He maintains that the Parole Board erred in 
considering a youthful offender adjudication, and that this violated his constitutional and 
statutory right to procedural due process. 
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
are set forth as follows: 
“Denied 24 [months] to 11/2012. Parole is denied. 
“After a careful review of your record, your personal interview 
and due deliberation, it is the determination of this Panel that, if 
released at this time, there is a reasonable probability that you 
wold not live at liberty without violating the law. Your release 
at this time is incompatible with the welfare and safety of the 
community, and will so deprecate the seriousness of the crime 
as to undermine respect for the law. 
“This decision is based upon the following factors: You appear 
before this Panel with the serious instant offenses of murder 
second and criminal possession of a weapon second; wherein 
you shot the victim multiple times causing his death. Your 
record includes a YO adjudication for robbery second. In 
addition, you have a poor record while in prison, which include 
multiple Tier I1 infractions and a Tier 111 infraction. 
‘‘Pnnsiderntinn hn. b.cm giyrn to ani- p-wrnm co111p1~7t~~n; 
however, your release at this time is denied.” 
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As stated in Executive Law $2594 (2) (c) (A): 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as 
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for law. In making the parole release decision, the procedures 
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred 
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be 
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals 
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational 
education, training or work assignments, therapy and 
interactions with staff and inmates; (ii) performance, if any, as 
a participant in a temporary release program; (iii) release plans 
including community resources, employment, education and 
training and support services available to the inmate; (iv) any 
deportation order issued by the federal government against the 
inmate while in the custody of the department and any 
recommendation regarding deportation made by the 
commissioner of the department pursuant to section one hundred 
forty-seven of the correction law; (v) any statement made to the 
board by the crime victim or the victim’s representative, where 
the crime victim is deceased or is mentally or physically 
incapacitated; (vi) the length of the determinate sentence to 
which the inmate would be subject had he or she received a 
sentence pursuant to section 70.70 or section 70.7 1 of the penal 
law for a felony defined in article two hundred twenty or article 
two hundred twenty-one of the penal law; (vii) the seriousness 
of the offense with due consideration to the type of sentence, 
length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing court, 
the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the pre-sentence 
probation report as well as consideration of any mitigating and 
aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior to 
confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the 
nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous 
probation or parole supervision and institutional confinement.” 
(Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A]). 
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept., 
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20041; Matter of Colladc, v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept., 
200 11). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part 
of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon 
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [ 19801). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which 
to disturb the discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. 
New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the 
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such 
factors as petitioner’s institutional programming, his improved disciplinary record, and his 
plans upon release. He was given ample opportunity to speak on his behalf. The decision 
was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and 
it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $259-i (see Matter of Siao-Pao, 1 1 NY3d 773 
[2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v. 
New York State Division of Pa&, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper and, in 
fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate’s crimes and their 
violent nature (e Matter of Matos v New York State Board of Parole, 87 AD3d 1193 [3d 
Dept., 201 11; Matter of’L)udlev v ‘lravis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the 
inmate’s criminal history (see Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 19971; 
Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept.. 19981). The Parole Board is not 
required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it considered in determining 
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the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss cach o w  (see Matter of Matos v New York 
State Board of Parole, supra; Matter of Young v New York Division of Parole, 74 AD3d 
1681, 1681-1682 [3rd Dept., 20101; Matter of Wise vNew York State pivision ofparole, 54 
AD3d 463 [3rd Dept., 20081). Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory language 
set forth in the first sentence of Executive Law tj 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silvero v 
Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd Dept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board 
may give considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the 
crimes for which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, 
together with the other statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible 
with the welfare of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] 
crime as to undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of UFII~O i Nc i r  1-OIL Siilic: Bii i ~ i w  
of Parole, 3 AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A], other 
citations omitted). 
“[Clontrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Board was entitled to consider the otherwise 
confidential information regarding petitioner’s prior youthful offender adjudications in arriving at 
its parole determination (E CPL 720.35 [2])” (Matter of X h t i r i  L h e w  f urk 5iiiie Llivrsiuri ul 
Parole, 47 AD3d 1 152, [3rd Dept., 20081). While the petitioner indicates that the Parole Board 
referred to the youthful offender adjudication as a conviction, that is not what the Parol 
Board stated. The youthful offender adjudication was properly considered. Thus, there was 
no statutory or constitutional due process violation. The case of Hughes v NYS Division of 
Parole (21 AD3d 1176 [3d Dept., 2005]), cited by the petitioner, is not applicable because 
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in that case, the Parole Board there incorrectly referred to a youthhl offender adjudication 
as a felony conviction. For that reason, the matter was remanded to the Parole Board for a 
new parole interview. That is not the situation here. 
Lastly, the Parole Board’s decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 
months) is within the Board’s discretion and was supported by the record (see Matter of Tatta 
v State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98 
NY2d 604). 
The Court has reviewed petitioner’s remaining arguments and contentions and finds 
them to be without merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the 
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order, 
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original 
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are 
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this 
decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute 
entF or filing i i n h -  CPJ R R r i l ~ ,  2220. C O U ~ I ~ L , ~  i. .  i m t  I L l i L i  cd Gum i h L .  iip)yh~;~hlc 
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provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. 
ENTER 
Dated: N o v c d x i  / 6  ,201 I 
Troy, New York 





Order To Show Cause dated August 1 1,20 1 1 ,  Petition, Supporting Papers 
and Exhibits 
Respondent’s Answer dated October 13,20 I 1, Supporting Papers and 
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